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During pandemic events, strategies such as quarantine and social distancing can be fundamental
to curb viral spreading. Such actions can reduce the number of simultaneous infection cases and
mitigate the disease spreading, which is relevant to the risk of a healthcare system collapse. Although
these strategies can be suggested, or even imposed, their actual implementation may depend on the
population perception of the risks associated with a potential infection. The current COVID-19
crisis, for instance, is showing that some individuals are much more prone than others to remain
isolated, avoiding unnecessary contacts, and respecting other restrictions. With this motivation,
we propose an epidemiological SIR model that uses evolutionary game theory to take into account
dynamic individual quarantine strategies, intending to combine in a single process social strategies,
individual risk perception, and viral spreading. The disease spreads in a population whose agents can
choose between self-isolation and a lifestyle careless of any epidemic risk. The strategy adoption is
individual and, most importantly, depends on the perceived disease risk compared to the quarantine
cost. The game payoff governs the strategy adoption, while the epidemic process governs the agent’s
health state. At the same time, the infection rate depends on the agent’s strategy while the perceived
disease risk depends on the fraction of infected agents. Our results show recurrent infection waves
phenomena, which are usually seen in previous historic epidemic scenarios with voluntary quarantine.
In particular, such waves re-occur as the population reduces disease awareness. Notably, the risk
perception parameter is found to be fundamental for controlling the magnitude of the infection peak,
while the final infection size is mainly dictated by the infection rates. Low awareness leads to a
single and strong infection peak, while a greater disease risk perception leads to shorter, although
more frequent, peaks. The proposed model spontaneously captures relevant aspects of a pandemic
event, highlighting the fundamental role of social strategies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
During a pandemic, quarantine and other distancing
rules can constitute the only option to curb the vi-
ral spreading, in particular in absence of vaccines or
medicines to control the symptoms resulting from an in-
fection [1–4]. Usually, these social rules are defined by
epidemiologists and other experts, however their actual
implementation can be quite challenging. For instance,
the current COVID-19 crisis [5–7] is showing how some
people are more easily prone to self-isolate under quar-
antine than others, even despite evidences on the po-
tential risks. By doing so, individuals that avoid any
form of restriction become an element of risk for them-
selves and for their community. In these scenarios, un-
derstanding how to stimulate and sustain prosocial be-
haviors has a paramount relevance. In this work, we aim
to study the relationship between human behavior, rep-
resented by individual quarantining strategies, and the
epidemic spreading of a disease. We emphasize that
this model is not an empirical description of the cur-
rent COVID-19 evolution. Instead, this is a general the-
∗Electronic address: marcoantonio.amaral@gmail.com
oretical framework that merges evolutionary game theory
(EGT) [8] and epidemiology in a single compartmental
model. Such framework allows rational strategy changes
between agents and can be used to better understand the
central aspects regarding a generic epidemic event.
Usually, the approach for studying a pandemic or epi-
demic process is based on compartmental models [4, 9,
10], which are a ubiquitous tool in epidemiology and
modern health management systems. The SIR model is
one of the most known epidemiological models [4, 9, 11].
It describes the spreading of a disease, which confers im-
munity against re-infection, in agents that evolve from
the susceptible compartment, S, to the infectious, I, and
eventually to the recovered (or removed) compartment
R. Although simple, it has been widely used to obtain
relevant aspects of epidemic processes that present the
S → I → R structure. Since its introduction in the sem-
inal paper by Kermack and McKendrick [12], the model
has been extensively studied and expanded to consider
different hypotheses and conditions. For example, some
epidemics may require more compartments, such as the
exposed and/or asymptomatic agents (known as SEIR
and SEAIR models respectively) [4, 13–15]. Spread on
complex networks was also proven useful to understand
the heterogeneity of agent contacts [16–20]. The study
of control and mitigation strategies such as vaccination
[21], modeling of vector-borne diseases [22, 23], and ef-
ar
X
iv
:2
00
8.
05
97
9v
1 
 [p
hy
sic
s.s
oc
-p
h]
  1
3 A
ug
 20
20
2fects of birth-and-death dynamics [2, 9] are other exam-
ples of the wide range of applications for compartmen-
tal models in epidemiology. Even rumor and corruption
spreading have found a natural framework in the SIR
model [24–30]. Nevertheless, most of those models re-
late only to the disease evolution, i.e., agents usually have
no conscious actions regarding the disease.
On the other hand, many control measures for infec-
tious diseases depend on individual decision making. In
this context, the recent field of behavioral epidemiology is
attracting the attention of researchers from diverse areas,
applying psychology, social engineering, and game theory
approaches to epidemiology (see [2, 11] for a review). In-
stead of considering agents having static roles, behavioral
epidemiology includes dynamic behavior changes. This
is a fertile ground for the recent area of social dynam-
ics, or sociophysics [31–33], which utilizes tools from
statistical physics together with evolutionary game the-
ory (and others) to better understand the complex be-
havior of humans [7, 34–39]. For example, in a novel
approach, Bauch [40–42] integrated a SIR model into
an EGT framework to analyze vaccination decision dy-
namics. By doing so, agents change their vaccination
strategy dynamically, depending on their perception of
the benefits and costs of a vaccine. This was later gen-
eralized into the so-called ‘vaccination games’ framework
(see [21] for a comprehensive review). Such approach
led to many interesting observations and predictions in
vaccination protocols [11, 42–53].
Recent works also investigated other mitigation strate-
gies such as awareness campaigns, information spread-
ing, multi-layer contact networks and dynamic contacts
[45, 46, 51, 54–64]. A general overview of these investi-
gations shows the presence of a cycle, where effective im-
munization measures lead to a low-risk perception, which
in turn weakens said mitigation strategies, bringing the
disease back [2]. The most recent anti-vaccination move-
ment is just one of a long history of such cycles [65–67].
Unfortunately, vaccination is not always an option, and
social isolation can be the only practice to prevent fur-
ther disease spread [1, 2, 68, 69]. Such was the case in
the famous episodes of the Spanish flu [70, 71], SARS
epidemic of 2002–2003 [72, 73] and more recently, during
the COVID-19 pandemic [3, 6, 74–77].
In the present work, we propose a ‘quarantine game’,
in which agents undergo a SIR epidemic process while,
at the same time, they can choose between two social
strategies, i.e. to self-quarantine and voluntarily stay at
home (Q), or continue acting normally (N). The strat-
egy is constantly updated based on the individual per-
ceived cost of the quarantine versus the perceived dis-
ease risk. While the scope of the model is intentionally
general, it is mainly motivated by the recent COVID-19
global pandemic and its consequences, that have shown a
wide spectrum of human responses to the viral spreading.
For instance, countries adopted many different restriction
policies, from mild distancing rules to strict lock-down.
However, when not mandatory, only a small fraction of
individuals may decide to self-isolate, while the rest of the
community avoids restrictions, endangering themselves
and others. The fast scale of this phenomenon has also
shown how collective perceptions of the disease risk has
changed in a matter of weeks (based or not on real scien-
tific data) [78]. This can be seen from how individuals
and policymakers across the world have so far considered
a variety of options, spanning from strict lock-downs to
doing nothing, with the hope of reaching some kind of
herd immunity [79–81]. The variety of social strate-
gies adopted worldwide, and in particular their results
in terms of successes and failures, constitute a relevant
evidence of how important is the behavioral component
of a given strategy during pandemic events.
Lastly, we emphasise that this is a theoretical model,
and in no way intends to fully grasp all the social and
political complexities exhibited by the current pandemic
scenario. On the contrary, it aims to merge two elements
of paramount relevance in these scenarios, i.e. game the-
ory and epidemic spreading, on a singular time scale.
II. MODEL
In the proposed model, susceptible agents (S) become
infected (I) with a rate βi upon contact with another in-
fected agent. Then, at a constant rate γ, infected agents
get recovered (R). Besides, agents can self-impose a quar-
antine (Q) and stay at home, or keep acting as in a nor-
mal situation (N). In the language of game theory, the
former strategy can be interpreted as a form of cooper-
ation, while the latter as a selfish strategy, i.e. a form
of defection. Therefore, we shall refer interchangeably to
agents adopting quarantine as cooperators, and agents
acting normally, as defectors. The main effect of strate-
gies is to influence the individual infection rate βi. We
assume that quarantined agents have a lower infection
rate than normal ones, that is βQ < βN , since those
agents reduce their interactions with other members of
their community. We expand the usual SIR model into
a five compartment model, SQ, SN , IQ IN , and R. As
recovered agents cannot be infected again, their strategy
is irrelevant. An illustrative diagram is shown in Figure
1.
By using a compartmental approach, the evolutionary
game dynamics is fully integrated into the model. This
differs from usual behavioral epidemiology approaches
where the strategy fraction evolves according to a sepa-
rate dynamic [2, 21, 41, 52, 55–59]. Hence, our model al-
lows cross interactions (such as SQ interacting with IN ),
giving rise to a rich scenario where sub-population cor-
relations can be observed.
Employing the game theory concept of perceived pay-
off (pi), agents base their future strategy adoption on the
perceived risk of their current strategy. A cooperator
(i.e. an agent self-imposing quarantine) expects to suf-
fer a perceived cost Ω. This represents the difficulties
one might face in a period of quarantine, but in turn, it
3FIG. 1: Schematic representation of the proposed model. We
consider five compartments where agents transition from S, I,
and R states through epidemiological dynamics. At the same
time, agents change their own strategy (Q or N) through
an evolutionary game dynamics. The parameter βi is the
infection rate that, depending on the strategy of an agent,
is defined as βQ or βN (i.e. quarantine versus normal life
stile). The parameter γ represents the recovery rate and is
independent of the specific strategy. Φ represents the strategy
change flux for each epidemic state and it is governed by the
evolutionary game dynamics.
strongly reduces the probability of being infected. This
leads to a constant payoff (or perceived risk) for cooper-
ators, Q, i.e.:
piQ = −Ω. (1)
On the other hand, defectors, i.e. agents adopting the
strategy N , have a perceived risk based on their infec-
tion probability multiplied by the perceived disease cost
parameter δ:
piN = −δβNI. (2)
We remark that the payoffs are based exclusively on
the agent’s individual perceptions. This is in accordance
with the widespread notion of individual risk perception
based on the number of (anecdotal) cases an agent is
exposed to [63, 82–84]. The game theory dynamics con-
cerns what agents perceive to be their risks and rewards,
and not necessarily the actual risk of a given action.
Following the usual evolutionary game dynamics, the
probability of a given agent i to adopt the strategy of
agent j is related to their payoffs pii and pij . We use the
typical Fermi rule [8]:
Θ(pii, pij) =
1
1 + e−(pij−pii)/k
. (3)
This allows strategy revision with a small but non zero
chance of mistakes. Such irrationality is measured by the
k parameter, set as k = 0.1 [8, 33, 85]. To obtain the to-
tal fraction of agents changing to a given strategy at any
moment, we consider the number of encounters between
any kind of Q and N strategies, inside each health com-
partment (S or I), and multiply it by the strategy tran-
sition probability Θ(pii, pij) between strategies i and/or
j. This is equivalent to the master equation (for each
compartment) of an evolutionary game dynamic [8, 86]
using the mean-field approximation, and leads us to the
strategy conversion rates, defined as
ΦS = SQ(SN + IN )Θ(piQ, piN )− SN (SQ + IQ)Θ(piN , piQ) (4)
ΦI = IQ(SN + IN )Θ(piQ, piN )− IN (SQ + IQ)Θ(piN , piQ). (5)
Here, ΦS is the rate at which SQ agents convert to SN
(and conversely for ΦI), and it is governed by the EGT
part of the model.
Regarding the infection dynamics, we assume three dif-
ferent infection rates, that is, βN > βa > βQ. Here, βN
is the infection rate for defectors interacting with defec-
tors, and similarly, βQ is the infection rate for cooper-
ators. Cooperators and defectors interact through the
cross-infection rate βa. For the sake of simplicity we set
βa = a(βN + βQ)/2, an average value of βQ and βN
weighted by the external control parameter 1 > a > 0.
We set a = 0.1 to allow a small but non zero chance
of cross-infection. The recovery rate is assumed to be
the same for all agents. Considering all the assumptions
above, we present the equations that describe the pro-
posed model,
˙SN = −SN (βNIN + βaIQ) + τΦS (6)
S˙Q = −SQ(βaIN + βQIQ)− τΦS (7)
˙IN = SN (βNIN + βaIQ)− γIN + τΦI (8)
˙IQ = SQ(βaIN + βQIQ)− γIQ − τΦI (9)
R˙ = γ(IN + IQ), (10)
where τ is the coupling parameter that controls how
quickly one adopts a new strategy, in relation to the time-
scale of the epidemic. Note that the current version of
the model does not include vital dynamics, such as birth
and death processes, since the model focuses on spread
dynamics that take place in a matter of months.
III. RESULTS
We start by noting that the payoff structure proposed
in Eqs. (1) and (2), is akin to the public goods and cli-
mate change dilemma games [87–90] where each agent
payoff depends on the total number of agents in some
other state. That is, the quarantine game is not a pair-
wise interaction game such as the prisoner dilemma [8].
In particular, in our case, the defector payoff depends
on the total number of infected agents (I), either coop-
erators or defectors, while the cooperator payoff is con-
stant. In doing so, we obtain the collective equivalent
of the snow-drift game (also known as chicken or hawk-
dove game [8]). I.e., as long as most of the population
4is healthy (susceptible or recovered), the best strategy
is to defect and to continue acting normally. But as
soon as most of the population chooses this strategy, the
amount of infected agents grows, resulting in a change of
the best strategy, that becomes to self-quarantine. This
payoff structure leads to a similar case as the general
anti-coordination game class, where the best strategy is
to do the opposite of what your opponents are doing. Or
specifically in our case, the opposite of what the major-
ity of the population is doing [8]. However, note that
the fraction of infected agents is not equal to the fraction
of defectors, due to the epidemiology dynamics. This is
similar to the dilemma presented in vaccination games
[40, 41, 50, 52, 82] where agents should vaccinate but, as
long as the majority of the population is vaccinating, the
incentive to not vaccinate grows. This anti-coordination
element is a central driver for the observed oscillatory
dynamics.
The numerical integration of the equations is obtained
through a 4th order Runge–Kutta method. For the in-
terested reader, a simplified Python script for solving the
equations is available at [91]. Regarding the results, un-
less stated otherwise, we set Ω = 1, τ = 1, γ = 1, βQ =
1, k = 0.1, a = 0.1 and focus on the effects of varying the
infection risk perception, δ, and defectors infection rate
βN . As initial condition, the starting setting for the pop-
ulation has only a very small fraction of infected agents,
i.e. I0 = 0.01, S0 = 1 − I0., while strategies are equally
divided between C and D.
Figure 2 presents the typical behavior of the popula-
tion. The most evident phenomenon is the recurrent in-
fection waves, even though the model has no explicit os-
cillatory terms. Looking at the evolution of the epidemio-
logical population, i.e. S = (SQ+SN ), I = (IQ+IN ), and
R, we notice that susceptible agents diminish on almost
discrete steps. The successive drops in S also coincide
with the peaks of infected agents. The inclusion of vol-
untary quarantine procedures in the SIR model sponta-
neously generates recurrent infection periods. This phe-
nomenon can be observed for a wide range of parameters
and it is a characteristic behavior of the model. Note
that such an effect is similar to the expected scenario of
real quarantine policies [2, 3, 74], that is, re-occurring in-
fection seasons. Interestingly, previous pandemics as the
Spanish flu (1918) presented such infection wave behav-
ior [92, 93].
The cause underlying the successive infection peaks
can be understood looking at the sub-population
(SQ, SN , IQ, IN , R) and the strategy distributions
through time. This can be seen in Figure 3. Remark-
ably, the population behavior hides a complex dynamic.
In particular, as the fraction of infected agents initially
grows, the cooperator’s payoff quickly becomes advanta-
geous. This is what causes the first broad peak of SQ,
as most agents start to undergo quarantine. In turn,
the total fraction of infected agents begin to decline, as
the majority of the population gets quarantined, with
a low value of infection rate. Nevertheless, as I tends
0 20 40 60 80 100
Time
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
Fr
ac
tio
n
S
I
R
FIG. 2: Typical behavior of the epidemiological population,
S = (SQ+SN ), I = (IQ+IN ), R. Note that recurrent infection
peaks emerge spontaneously. Here δ = 10, βN = 10.
to 0, the payoff for agents leaving quarantine (defector
strategy) starts to grow and eventually it becomes
greater than the cooperator’s payoff. This triggers a
flux of SQ → SN , that is, people leaving quarantine.
Such an event corresponds to the sharp increase in SN ,
near the beginning of the second infection wave. With
more and more agents leaving quarantine, a second
peak of infected agents inevitably occurs. Indeed, we
see that the infection peaks are always preceded by a
sharp increase in the defector density. At this point,
SN begins to decrease sharply because part of them
becomes infected and the others (still susceptible) start
becoming cooperators (the second and broad peak in
SQ). This process repeats itself again and again, at each
time with less active agents. An interesting effect also
occurs in the sub-population of infected agents, i.e. the
infection peak on defectors always precedes the peak
of cooperators. We note that the number and height
of the peaks, and recurrent infection cycles, are highly
dependent on δ.
Next, we analyze the mixed strategy equilibrium point
to obtain the strategy inflection points. This is a similar
approach as the one used in [42] for vaccination games.
Suppose a mixed strategy where an agent has a proba-
bility P to cooperate. This leads to the average expected
payoff of p¯i = PpiQ + (1 − P )piN . We want to maximize
it in relation to P , therefore:
p¯i = P (δβNI − Ω)− δβNI. (11)
Since all parameters are greater than zero, we obtain
the maximum expected payoff value when P = 1 (always
cooperate) if δβNI > Ω. Conversely, if δβNI < Ω, the
maximum average payoff occurs for P = 0 (always de-
fect). This implies that agents will start changing strate-
gies at an infection level of:
I ′ =
Ω
δβN
(12)
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FIG. 3: Typical behavior of the sub-population,
SQ, SN , IQ, IN , R. The successive infection peaks are
due to the frequent oscillations in the strategies, even if the
total susceptible and removed individuals do not oscillate.
Here, δ = 10, βN = 10.
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FIG. 4: Infected agents (I) and defectors strategy fraction (D)
time evolution. The horizontal line represents the value I ′ =
Ω/δβN . The vertical dashed lines indicate when I(t) = I
′.
As expected, these are the strategy maximum and minimum
values. Here δ = 10, βN = 5.
In a system composed of fully rational agents, the
strategy maximum and minimum values will coincide
with the points mentioned above. Numerical anal-
ysis of the ODE integration shows good agreement
with such prediction even if we use the Fermi strat-
egy probability (an approach that has inherent fluctua-
tions/irrationality). This can be seen in Figure 4. We
note that the main effect of greater irrationality, i.e.
larger values of k, is to make the strategy oscillations
more smooth around the inflection points. This analysis
remained accurate for all studied values of δ,Ω, and βN .
Also, note that the peak of infections always happens
between a maximum and minimum value of D, in a way
consistent with all studied values of parameters.
To better understand the effect of the disease risk per-
ceptions on the infection peak size and duration, we vary
the value of δ, as this is the central parameter we are
interested in. Figure 5 shows the population dynamics
when δ = {0; 5; 10}. For low-risk perceptions, agents
leave quarantine earlier and in great numbers. This cre-
ates a big single infection peak, which is consistent with
the current worst-case scenarios for a pandemic [2, 3, 74].
As we increase the risk perception, agents will tend to co-
operate (stay in quarantine) for longer periods, leading
to the distribution of smaller infection peaks along one
or more infection cycles. We highlight that this is an
emergent behavior that spontaneously appears by con-
sidering the evolutionary game dynamics. In a pandemic
scenario, this can be one of the most important aspects
of a quarantine policy, since the healthcare system may
have a small capacity, and cannot take care of all infected
agents at the same time [10].
The effects of different disease perception values are
summarized in Figure 6. Note that when δ = 16 there
are even five different infection peaks, all with a very
small magnitude. Another interesting effect to observe is
that the first infection peak is not always the highest. For
larger values of δ, the highest peak can happen after some
initial (small) infection wave. Moreover, a higher risk
perception better distributes the cases over long periods.
We emphasize that the infection peak magnitude can
be a very important quantity when dealing with pan-
demics [10]. In Figure 7 we present the maximum si-
multaneous infection size (Imax) as a function of the per-
ceived disease risk for different defector infection rates,
βN . We highlight that the equations of the proposed
model can always be normalized in relation to βQ, defin-
ing a new time scale. Because of this, without loss of
generality, we chose to vary only βN in the presented re-
sults. We see that the disease awareness, δ, can greatly
help diminish the maximum simultaneous infected num-
ber. On the other hand, the effect of βN in Imax is less
pronounced.
We now analyze the infection size, measured by the
final density of removed agents, R∗, shown in Figure 8.
We note that the increase in δ can lead, on average, to
slightly smaller R∗ values. The decrease is more pro-
nounced when βN < 2. Differently from Imax however,
the behavior of R∗ is not monotonous in δ, presenting
non-periodic oscillations.
Next we present the parameter space βN × δ for the
final density of removed agents, R∗ in Figure 9. As
expected, increased disease risk perceptions leads to a
smaller final density of removed agents. Nevertheless, it
is clear that this behavior is not trivial, and different in-
fection rates result in large oscillations. It is interesting
to note that the valleys and peaks follow, on average, an
inverse proportion with δ. For instance, for a fixed value
of R∗, βN ∝ 1/δ. Note that the value of Imax is highly
dependent on δ but does not change considerably with
βN .
As τ is the coupling constant between the epidemic
and evolutionary game dynamics, it is correlated with
how quickly a population is able to respond to new in-
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FIG. 5: Typical behavior for diverse disease risk perception. In a) there is no disease risk perception, δ = 0, and the disease
behaves according to the usual SIR dynamics, with a big and singular infection peak. In b) δ = 5 and while there are two
infection waves, their magnitude is considerably smaller. Finally, in c) δ = 10, and we can see three shallow infection peaks.
Note that as δ increases, the infection are distributed during a longer time span. In general, an increase in risk perception leads
to smaller, and more distributed, infection peaks. Here βN = 5.
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FIG. 6: Evolution of infected agents for different disease
perception values, δ. This parameter plays a key role in the
infection peak magnitude, making it shorter while distribut-
ing the cases over many smaller infection waves. Here βN = 5.
formation regarding the current disease situation. Figure
10 reports the effects of different τ in the evolution of the
strategies. Notably, increasing its value causes strategy
changes to become more frequent. This in turn entails
more oscillations in the whole population. Every peak
in the defector density also leads, eventually, to a peak
in the density of infected agents, I. Variations in τ do
not change the final infection size considerably. We also
note that variations in the irrationality parameter, k, did
not drastically affect the dynamics for reasonable values
(0.01 < k < 2). The main effect of decreasing k is to
make the strategy adoption curves sharper around the
inflection points. On the other hand, a high irrationality
parameter makes the strategy changes more smoothly in
time.
Finally, we generalize the results of the proposed model
according to the evolutionary game theory framework. It
is a known result that the strategy equilibrium of a clas-
sical game is invariant in relation to the multiplication
and/or sum of a constant value over all payoffs [8]. There-
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FIG. 7: Maximum simultaneous infected agents density
(Imax) as a function of the perceived disease risk δ. The
magnitude of the peak decreases for greater disease aware-
ness values.
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FIG. 8: Infection size, measured as the final value of removed
agents, R∗. The impact of δ in R∗ is less pronounced than
in Imax. For some values of βN , the fraction R
∗ presents
oscillations.
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FIG. 9: Phase space βN×δ for the final epidemic size R∗. The
oscillations of R∗ in relation to both parameters are present
for all studied values. Note that the final epidemic size de-
creases with δ mainly for low βN values.
fore, we can simplify the proposed payoff structure, leav-
ing intact the central characteristics of the game. This
allows us to obtain relevant information regarding the
general game class. We first sum Ω in both payoffs and
then divide them by βNδ. Using  = Ω/βNδ, we get the
simplified version:
piQ = 0. (13)
piN = − I. (14)
Note that  is the ratio between the perceived cost of
quarantine and the cost of getting infected. By defini-
tion, 0 <  < 1 as we always expect Ω < βNδ, i.e. the
cost of performing a quarantining is smaller than that
of being infected. This general payoff structure correctly
predicts the most essential feature of our model, i.e. the
best strategy is to stay on quarantine if there are many
infected agents (I > ), and leave quarantine in the op-
posite case. This is very similar to the anti-coordination
game class, where the best strategy is to do the oppo-
site of your opponent. Here, however, the main factor
to consider is the number of infected agents, and not of
quarantined ones.
If everyone is undergoing a quarantine, one has a big
incentive to avoid such strategy. On the other hand, if
everyone is not taking quarantine precautions, one has
a big incentive to do so. This general payoff structure
is similar to the free-ride scenario obtained in vaccina-
tion games [52, 82] and other models with mitigation
policies [46, 54–59]. The inflection point where defec-
tion becomes more advantageous can be clearly stated
as I ′ = . Differently from a classic game, however,
I = I(t), that is, the number of infected agents in our
model is time dependent and will depend on the number
of agents using the strategy Q or N . Note however that
such payoff manipulation only makes the classic game
equilibrium invariant, not its evolutionary counterpart.
For the population dynamics, the payoff multiplication
has the equivalent effect of changing the value of k in the
transition probability, (3), i.e. k′ = kβNδ.
It is also possible to show that the model is different
from the SIR model with two distinct infection rates.
Using the definition S = SQ + SN and I = IQ + IN we
see that:
S˙ = −IQ(βaSN + βQSQ)− IN (βNSN + βaSQ) (15)
I˙ = IQ(βaSN + βQSQ) + IN (βNSN + βaSQ)− γI (16)
R˙ = γI (17)
Since the flux (Φ) terms regard only transitions be-
tween the same epidemiological compartment, they van-
ish when we look only at the total epidemiological level of
the population. Even so, we see that the model does not
reduce to the SIR model with two infection rates. In-
deed we cannot totally disappear with the sub-population
terms.
Furthermore, we can also consider the population at
the level of strategy adoption dynamics. C and D repre-
sent the density of cooperators and defectors respectively.
For the proposed model we have C = (SQ + IQ)/(S+ I),
and since we only have two strategies, D = 1 − C. The
rate of change in the strategies comes only from the strat-
egy flux terms ΦS and ΦI . In other words, C˙ = −ΦS−ΦI .
Using Equations (4) and (5), we obtain:
C˙ = (SN + IN )(SQ + IQ)Θ(piN , piQ)
− (SQ + IQ)(SN + IN )Θ(piQ, piN )
Re-arranging the terms and noting that SQ + IQ =
C(S+ I) , SN + IN = D(S+ I), and that S+ I = 1−R,
we finally obtain:
C˙ = (1−R)2CD[Θ(piN , piQ)−Θ(piQ, piN )] (18)
The first term, (1 − R)2, modulates the speed of the
strategy change (C˙), as it is related to the total available
population allowed to vary the strategies. Most impor-
tant, however, is the rest of the equation, which is pre-
cisely the usual mean-field form of the master equation
for the evolution of cooperation in a two strategy game,
such as the prisoner’s dilemma [8]. We can observe that
the proposed model is self-consistent and returns the evo-
lutionary game when we only look at the strategy den-
sities. At the same time, (numerically) the model also
returns the classic SIR dynamics with two infection rates
when we make τ = βa = 0, i.e. when we turn off the
strategy dynamics and cross infection terms.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
A common approach to analyze complex systems is to
isolate its essential elements and features, trying to fil-
ter out less relevant components. Such is the case of
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FIG. 10: Strategy adoption evolution for different coupling constant values τ . In a) we present a value corresponding to half
the time-scale of the epidemics, i.e. τ = 0.5. Figure b) presents a time-scale twice as fast, τ = 2. The peaks in the defector
fraction always correlates to peaks in the total infected population I. Greater τ values leads to more frequent oscillations in
the strategy distribution, and consequently more infection peaks with lower heights. Here we used δ = 10, βN = 10.
social behaviors and disease spreading, two intricate pro-
cesses that, mainly for the sake of simplicity, are often
analyzed separately. In order to describe their dynamics,
identifying their essential elements and interactions, it is
fundamental to define a model able to capture, as much
as possible, the observed phenomena while maintaining
its simplicity. Due to the relevance of the behavioral
component, in particular epidemic situations such as the
COVID-19 crisis, here we proposed a theoretical frame-
work devised to combine social strategies with epidemic
spreading. To this end, we present a simplified version of
the epidemiological SIR model merged with an evolution-
ary game that allows agents to rationally choose between
a voluntary quarantine or a normal lifestyle during the
spreading of a generic disease. Following this approach,
we obtain a single compartmental model that integrates
into the same time scale the rational decision making,
from game theory, and the epidemiological dynamics of
the SIR model. The latter has been chosen as a test case,
however, the proposed model can also be realized consid-
ering other variations, as the SIS and SEAIR models,
as well as other game theory frameworks. The infection
and recovery rates are given by the epidemiological dy-
namics, while the strategy changes are controlled by the
so-called strategy update rules, widely studied in evolu-
tionary game theory. Nevertheless, the infection rates
depend on the chosen strategy, whereas the risk percep-
tion and payoff of each strategy depend on the number
of infected individuals.
We investigate the model through numerical and ana-
lytical approaches. Remarkably, the model presents indi-
vidual reactions to the disease infection level, which can
result in secondary infections and the re-emergence of the
disease spreading after most of the population dismiss its
risk. In particular, our results revealed multiple infection
peaks for higher disease risk perceptions, very similar to
the observed behavior of past epidemic cases with vol-
untary quarantine measures. The interplay between the
contagion and strategy dynamics exhibited a rich behav-
ior. The main parameter that we studied in the model
is the perceived disease risk, δ, i.e. a measure of how
strongly the population sees the individual cost of being
infected. We show that while this parameter has a small
effect on the final infection size, it is most important con-
cerning the infection peak size. Notably, the maximum
magnitude of the infection peak is found to be inversely
proportional to the disease perceive risk δ.
It is worth to emphasize that for for no perceived dis-
ease risk, agents decide to avoid quarantine and the popu-
lation quickly suffers from a widespread infection, result-
ing in a single and huge peak of simultaneously infected
agents. As recent events related to the global COVID-
19 pandemic have shown, the total infection peak is an
observable of paramount relevance. In particular, dur-
ing these critical scenarios, healthcare systems may risk
to collapse, due to the possibility that the amount of
infected individuals saturates their total capacity [10].
That is one of the reasons why not only the total epi-
demic size is important, but also the maximum number
of simultaneous infections. In the proposed model, the
inclusion of the perceived disease risk makes individu-
als prone to quarantine for longer times, resulting in a
smaller infection peak. As we increase the perceived risk,
multiple smaller peaks emerge. This is a direct result of
the interconnection between two complex processes, i.e.
disease spreading by the SIR model, and rational strat-
egy choices by the evolutionary game dynamics. We see
that for high values of δ, the disease can stay active for
longer times and present more infection waves. Neverthe-
less, those peaks are shorter and the maximum number of
simultaneous infections is highly dependent on δ, quickly
diminishing as the disease risk perception increases.
We also perform a payoff analysis to find the optimum
mixed strategy for a given number of infected individu-
als. This allows us to analytically obtain the inflection
point of the strategy adoption dynamics. This may be
9used to understand both the dependence of the most used
strategy as a function of the infection number, and when
the next infection wave can emerge again. Analyzing
other parameters we find that the coupling constant τ
is responsible for changing the speed of the population
response to new infections, i.e. how fast the strategy
adoption occurs, but has no strong effect on the infec-
tion peak size. In the same way, the irrationality param-
eter k can change the properties of the strategy adoption
dynamics without changing its inflection points or the
infection peak size. Lastly, we show that the model is
self-consistent and returns the usual replicator equation
when looking only at the strategy fractions of the popu-
lation dynamics. Likewise, when we turn off the interac-
tions between the populations (τ = βa = 0) we get back
two separated SIR populations, evolving independently.
Overall, the achieved results point to the importance
of the disease perceived risk in the spreading dynamics
and how such an ingredient can be included in more re-
alistic modeling. The area of behavioral epidemiology
is relatively recent, and evolutionary game theory and
sociophysics seem to have much to add with their ap-
proaches. As examples, we cite recent works that have
highlighted how evolutionary game dynamics can be used
together with an epidemiology-based approach to model
social contact behavior such as corruption and rumor
spreading [24–26, 28, 94, 95]. In this sense, we believe
that this model can be used as an initial framework to un-
derstand more complex phenomena regarding behavioral
epidemiology, especially the integration of game theory
in compartment models.
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